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Abstract: 
In bringing to the screen the life of murderer Robert Stroud in Birdman of Alcatraz (United 
Artists, 1962), filmmakers encountered official obstruction from the director of the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons, James V. Bennett. Campaigning for the release of Stroud, Burt Lancaster 
retaliated by exposing Bennett’s efforts to censor the film as evidence of a personal 
vendetta against the prisoner. However, new archival research demonstrates how the 
Bureau had collaborated with Hollywood’s own censorship body, the Production Code 
Administration, for many years - and that Birdman was in fact the culmination of a decades-
long struggle to control all films about Alcatraz. 
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Bennett, Breen and the Birdman of Alcatraz 
A Case Study of Collaborative Censorship between the Production Code 
Administration and the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
 
In 1946, the warden of Alcatraz Penitentiary wrote to his boss, James V. Bennett, 
about the plans of one inmate to interest filmmakers in his memoir of prison life, tentatively 
entitled ‘Rehabilitation’. As the seasoned Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Bennett 
responded by joking that he would “give up” his position as one of the most respected 
office-holders in Washington D.C. and “move immediately to Hollywood” if studios were so 
foolish with their money as to pay the $50,000 that the prisoner wanted for the rights.1  
As it turned out, several filmmakers were very interested: for the prisoner in 
question was one Robert F. Stroud, better known as the ‘Birdman of Alcatraz’. When United 
Artists and Norma Productions finally brought the film of that name to the screen in 1962, 
with Stroud personified with measured dignity by Burt Lancaster, they actually invested over 
$2.6 million.2 Yet far from giving up his job, Bennett fought hard to block production by 
enlisting in his campaign the film industry’s own ‘censorship’ authority, the Production Code 
Administration (PCA). The story of that failed effort, culminating in the explicit repudiation 
of the Bureau in John Frankenheimer’s movie, reveals the mechanisms by which a federal 
government agency sought to exert influence within the film industry; offers a striking 
example of how Hollywood studios weighed up their interests between capitalizing on a 
sensational story and good “industry policy”; and adds to our understanding of how 
independent filmmakers eventually challenged the censorious authority of both the 
Production Code and the government, casting themselves, and Stroud with them, as rebels 
against “the system.” 
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Bennett and Stroud 
Bennett had had good reason to feel secure that anything Stroud wrote would 
remain in Alcatraz “until his discharge,” for in the forties there was no expectation of that 
occurring anytime soon.3 A multiple killer, Stroud had been in prison since 1909. Described 
as an “aggressively defiant man with a short fuse” who showed “not a hint of regret” for his 
crimes, he had first been convicted of manslaughter for killing a bartender in Juneau, 
Alaska.4 His sentence was then extended for wounding another prisoner in a “trivial 
argument”; and in 1916 he had been sentenced to hang for first-degree murder, having 
brutally stabbed a prison guard to death in front of eleven hundred inmates in the 
Leavenworth Federal Penitentiary. When that death penalty was commuted by President 
Wilson in 1920, the Attorney General directed that Stroud’s life sentence should be served 
in solitary confinement. It was in such confinement, with the support of tolerant 
Leavenworth wardens, that Stroud had begun raising canaries and wrote the treatise on 
bird diseases that would bring him publicity and earn him his sobriquet. However, regarding 
him as “maladjusted with homicidal tendencies,” prison authorities denied him parole and 
eventually transferred him to Alcatraz in 1942.5 He was still in federal custody at the time of 
the film’s release, and remained so until his death in 1963.  
Stroud spent a total of 54 years in prison, 42 of them in isolation. Yet in the 1950s, 
Bennett’s belief that Stroud’s story would remain similarly contained and isolated on 
Alcatraz was undermined by Thomas Gaddis, a former corrections officer, who first 
published an article on Stroud in the May 1953 edition of Cosmopolitan, and then developed 
the book of Birdman of Alcatraz printed by Random House in 1955. Utilizing almost four 
thousand letters, to Stroud’s family, his wife, and various bird breeders, Gaddis’s account 
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was based on sources which described “everything Stroud had done” in the convict’s own 
words, essentially reworking and expanding upon Stroud’s ‘Rehabilitation’ narrative.6  
Whilst not absolving Stroud of his crimes, this narrative cast Stroud’s confinement as 
“four decades of extended and profound punishment,” carried out in vindictive reprisal for 
his repeated crossing of the Bureau of Prisons in general, and Bennett in particular.7 There 
certainly seemed to be an element of retribution for the murder of guard Andrew Turner in 
the original order isolating Stroud from the general prison population. But the Bureau of 
Prisons (BOP) was not formed until 1930, making Stroud’s sentence an inherited problem; 
one that Bennett first encountered as an assistant to director Sanford Bates in 1931.  
When the newly-organized Bureau issued an order prohibiting private businesses by 
prison inmates, Stroud took it as a personal challenge and refused to comply. He had been 
raising birds in his cell for almost a decade, which his mother then sold along with a 
supposed cure for sceptic fever named “Stroud’s Specific.” He also contributed to Roller 
Canary Journal and Bird World magazine and had developed a following among bird 
breeders for his diagnostic articles. Through his mother and Della Mae Jones, a canary-
breeder who had come to know of his incarceration, Stroud launched a campaign, “crying 
for help” against the “heartless” government that “proposed to take his birds away from 
him.”8  
Stunned to discover how “a jailbird learned to save their canaries,” bird clubs across 
the country petitioned Congress, and national newspapers and radio networks took up the 
story.9 Facing its first major public relations problem, the Bureau dispatched Bennett to 
Leavenworth to negotiate. Stroud, however, was stubborn, believing he had the Bureau 
over a barrel. When Bennett made the “incredible offer” of making Stroud the salaried head 
of a “bird business” that the BOP would “operate as part of prison industries”, Stroud 
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refused.10 He even questioned the constitutionality of how a prisoner could be “prevented 
from directing his business, and yet the Government be empowered to do it, in partnership 
with him.” This question threatened the broader idea of the Federal Prison Industries 
program itself, a personal project of Bennett’s, planned as the “largest work program for 
prisoners ever devised.”11 According to Gaddis, this challenge “forced” Bennett to “return to 
Washington empty-handed” – with the Bureau not only conceding that Stroud could 
continue his canary business, but bowing to his demands for an enlarged cell and the 
provision of laboratory equipment. Stroud and Gaddis claimed that Bennett “never forgot” 
this defeat.12 As Gaddis framed the story, those in the prison system who “tried to bring 
conditions to light, or call attention to themselves, received the hard fist of reprisal.”13  
Stroud not only drew attention to himself in 1931, but courted publicity again in 
1933 when he “married” Della Jones “despite prison walls,” by making the elaborate claim 
that the 1783 Treaty of Paris applied to prisoners “living on federal property” and thus 
required the government to recognize as legal a “simple sworn statement” of a “man and a 
woman that they were husband and wife.”14 It was a stunt designed to reignite media 
interest and make himself “too noticeable” for the Bureau to move to Alcatraz.15 According 
to Gaddis, however, bringing the “glare of national attention” was an “unforgivable sin” in 
the Bureau’s eyes – and from such a perspective, Stroud’s continued incarceration, his 
failure to win parole or release, and his transfer to Alcatraz (at which point he lost his birds) 
was presented as “the result of a personal vendetta against him by Federal prison 
officials.”16 
The BOP was also accused of intentionally forbidding the reprinting of Stroud’s 
Digest of the Diseases of Birds to ensure “it lost money”; of suppressing a manuscript he 
started writing about prison history; and of leaking information about Stroud’s 
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homosexuality in a deliberate effort to “discredit” the campaign to release him.17 The claims 
twisted the truth to Stroud’s purposes, but even from behind bars he repeatedly promoted 
the notion of a “vendetta.” Within the prison, he invented tall stories to impress inmates, 
telling them that Bennett had tried to muscle in on his bird business, wanting a “large cut” 
of the profits for himself and condemning Stroud to “life in isolation” when he refused.18 
Externally, Stroud filed a motion of “illegal confinement” with the courts in 1943 in which he 
claimed that Bennett was motivated by “personal animosity.”19 This came to dominate the 
public’s perception. By 1960, when Life magazine ran an article on Stroud ahead of the film’s 
production, his story was presented as that of a “defiant individualist” engaged “in a 
remorseless contest of wills” with the Bureau’s director.20 One year later, the Los Angeles 
Mirror accused Bennett of personally “spearhead[ing] the vindictive campaign to keep the 
old convict behind bars.”21 That Bennett should have attempted to block the filming of 
Birdman of Alcatraz, warning film executives “that he would actively oppose the project,” 
thus played perfectly into Stroud’s narrative of the Bureau weaving “a net of interference 
and persecution” around him “since 1920.”22  
The truth is of course much more complex. Bennett did bring “intense pressure” to 
bear on filmmakers interested in Stroud, as detailed below in the discussion of Jack 
Cumming’s failed effort to produce the film three years earlier.  However, the files of the 
Production Code Administration in the Special Collections archives of the Margaret Herrick 
Library in Los Angeles demonstrate that Bennett’s engagement with the film industry went 
back many years before Birdman of Alcatraz was on the horizon.  Indeed, this article’s study 
of Birdman began somewhat in reverse, when the author was looking through the PCA files 
for evidence of historical films that never got made.  Of the many such files labelled 
“unproduced”, one relating to ‘The Cecil Wright Story’ contained such extensive and 
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elaborate letters and memoranda detailing Sam Baerwitz’s doomed-to-failure struggle with 
both the Bureau of Prisons and the PCA to tell the story of the self-anointed ‘Brain of 
Alcatraz’, that it pushed me in search of further references to Bennett’s engagement with 
Hollywood.  Moreover, its contrast to the relative thinness of the PCA file on Birdman, 
prompted the research question of why the PCA had been so active in blocking the 
production of Wright’s story in the early 1950s, yet seemingly made little comment when 
Lancaster’s company came to ignore Bennett’s objections about Stroud less than a decade 
later.  Investigating that conundrum pushed the hunt in two different directions.  The first 
was to explore the truth behind the allegations of made in the interviews and articles 
surrounding Birdman’s release in the early 1960s, concerning Bennett’s attempts to halt 
production (a trail which led me to the Cummings’ papers).  The second was to continue to 
investigate any PCA files containing correspondence with Bennett – almost all of which 
turned out to concern films making mention of Alcatraz.  On one level, this new research is a 
demonstration of how sources relating to unrealized film projects can be essential to 
understanding and analysing films that were made.  On the other, it simultaneously provides 
a corrective to the discourse woven around and within Birdman of Alcatraz, suggesting that 
far from Bennett’s obstructionism being a personal “vendetta” against Stroud in particular, 
his overriding concern lay with representations of Alcatraz in general.  In many ways 
Birdman was just the last in a long line of film proposals Bennett felt duty-bound to dissuade 
Hollywood from pursuing. 
 
Bennett, Alcatraz and the Breen Office 
From the moment it opened in August 1934, the American public was fascinated by 
Alcatraz. As the federal government’s response to the “epidemics of murders, gangland 
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massacres, kidnappings, and bank robberies that had dominated the headlines for more 
than a decade,” the island penitentiary in the allegedly “shark-infested” waters of San 
Francisco Bay was viewed as the ultimate, escape-proof “punishment prison.”23  The 
attention given to “public enemy” inmates like ‘Machine Gun’ Kelly and Al Capone 
cemented its notoriety. From the outset, however, the Bureau responsible for running it 
was never “entirely comfortable with the idea” of Alcatraz. Its “draconian image” was at 
odds with the “more reform-oriented” approaches to penology that Sanford Bates and 
James Bennett were keen to pursue and promote.24 Contrary to Stroud’s prejudices, 
Bennett was a progressive reformer. Author of the report (entitled The Federal Penal and 
Correctional Problem) which had paved the way for the creation of the BOP, Bennett saw its 
first order of business as “humanizing” prison life, with a “mandate to develop and 
implement innovative programs that would promote rehabilitation.”25  
Bennett led the way in abolishing corporal punishment, pushed for “better 
educational and vocational programmes,” hammered home the need to increase probation, 
and wanted federal prisons to “set an example” that would inspire reforms throughout the 
states.26 Alcatraz had some value in his “inmate classification” system, removing from other 
federal institutions the “really bad apples” who, “if they were permitted to remain, would 
make necessary a much more repressive program and complicate rehabilitative 
opportunities.”27 Nevertheless, stories circulated about Alcatraz inmates being “locked up in 
dungeons”; of prisoners being “psychologically brutalized”; of men so desperate that they 
self-mutilated (like Rufe Persful) or attempted escape knowing it was truly suicidal (as in the 
case of Joseph Bowers). 28  Growing denunciations of the Bureau for “maintaining a 
penitentiary that seemed to contradict so many aspects of progressive penology,” and his 
own discomfort with it as a “symbol of retributive justice,” led Bennett to unsuccessfully 
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propose its closure within a year of becoming director of the BOP in 1937.29 The last thing 
he wanted was more sensationalistic coverage of the Rock emanating from Hollywood. 
To this end, Bennett engaged with the Production Code Administration.  In the same 
year that Alcatraz opened, the PCA had been established by the Motion Picture Producers 
and Distributors of America (MPPDA) to work with filmmakers to ensure that Hollywood’s 
output met with the “accepted standards of morality and good taste” which had been 
delineated in the Motion Picture Production Code.30 The Code had been in operation since 
1930, but in 1934 it became the job of the PCA director, Joseph Breen, and his staff, to 
negotiate with writers and producers at scripting stage, to ensure that resulting films were 
compliant. Premised on the “general principle” that “no picture shall be produced that will 
lower the moral standards of those who see it,” the Code was the basis for a system of self-
regulation within the industry, implemented to protect studios from external forms of 
regulation, including censor boards in various states and the threat of federal censorship.31 
Although the PCA was therefore an integral part of the studio system, outsiders commonly 
saw it as a censoring authority, capable of controlling the content of Hollywood’s movies.  
As a result, in August of 1937, when Bennett and the Justice Department heard that 
Warner Bros. had prepared a script for Alcatraz Island, the Attorney General, Homer S. 
Cummings, wrote to the president of MPPDA, Will Hays, asking for “cooperation” in 
ensuring “that the picture will not be produced.”32 Hays passed this overt request for 
censorship on to the PCA. This presented a problem; not because Breen was inherently 
opposed to the demand but because it came too late. Alcatraz Island had already been 
filmed.  
The PCA had received the script in April and, by the terms of the Code, it conformed 
to the guidelines concerning the “treatment of crimes,” by which criminals must not be 
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made to “seem heroic and justified.”33 There was concern about the “gangster flavor” of the 
screenplay, which contravened a moratorium on gangster films implemented in 1935, but 
since the story was primarily about a “racketeer who tries to “go straight,” it was eventually 
deemed acceptable by Breen.34 The Attorney General’s request for “cooperation,” however, 
prompted Breen to revisit the film’s representation of Alcatraz, where the “bulk of the 
prison action” occurred.35 The Code did give the PCA authority to intervene if a story 
breached the principle that “the Law... shall not be ridiculed,” or if an “institution” could be 
deemed to have not been represented “fairly.”36 However, Breen believed that the film’s 
scenes of prison life gave the impression that “the government operates at Alcatraz a well-
organized and thoroughly disciplined prison, where most rigid regulations are enforced 
without... any suggestion of inhuman or brutal treatment” (in contrast to earlier prison films 
such as I am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang (Warner Bros., 1932)). He could not justifiably 
refuse a Certificate of Approval to Warner Bros., though he did suggest withholding the 
release of Alcatraz Island until a representative of the Bureau of Prisons could “look at the 
picture and tell us, specifically, just what it is which, in his judgement, is objectionable.” As 
Breen conceded, the PCA itself had no objective way of judging “which details may, or may 
not be accurate.”37  
While it was too late to obstruct Alcatraz Island in a meaningful way, the 
consequence was that Breen soon established a “gentleman’s agreement” between the PCA 
and the Bureau concerning future productions. Alarm arose when drafts of publicity for 
Edward. G. Robinson’s The Last Gangster (MGM, 1937) proclaimed that audiences would 
“see the secrets of Alcatraz exposed”; but the MPPDA pre-empted the Department of 
Justice’s likely objection by ordering the studio to delete all references to the island 
penitentiary in both the film and its advertising, so that the protagonist “would be sent to 
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prison without specifically identifying the prison.”38 However, in May 1938, Sheila Graham’s 
syndicated “Hollywood Today” column reported that “Paramount was thinking of producing 
a picture entitled King of Alcatraz… to be based on the recent mental illness of Al Capone.”   
Bennett wrote to Hays and Breen in grave concern over Graham’s claim that the film would 
imply “prison life made Al Capone insane.”39  The PCA interceded immediately, before the 
studio could even explain that the report was “erroneous” and that the planned story dealt 
with a prisoner who only “feigns illness in order to be removed to a hospital in San Francisco 
from which he plots an escape.”40 On May 16, 1938, Breen gave Bennett his assurance that 
Hollywood would “put no pictures into production, dealing with any federal prison without 
first submitting a copy of the script to the Department of Justice in Washington,” and 
informed studios that such screenplays would not be “okayed for picture making” until they 
had “U.S. Government approval.”41  
This might appear to be an extraordinary concession, yet it was well in accordance 
with the PCA’s practice. For instance, according to Lawrence Suid, the Navy Department had 
drawn up “regulations of cooperation with Hollywood” dating back to at least 1932, with 
“requirements for review...[and] script approval” even for movies that wanted to utilize 
stock footage of Navy vessels at sea.42 By the 1950s, this had evolved into a “cooperation 
agreement” with the Department of Defense as a whole, which meant that “almost every 
film involving recent U.S. military history” would be weighed against the DOD’s “best 
interests” in securing approval to “extend cooperation.”43 As Ruth Vasey has written, “the 
regulation of Hollywood’s output was actually far more broadly based than a reading of the 
Code would suggest,” for the PCA often extended its authority to act and advise in 
forestalling all manner of potential public relations problems.44 Breen labelled these as 
matters of “industry policy,” warning producers whenever the PCA believed a film might 
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“bring in its train results which are not felt to be for the best interests of the organized 
industry.”45 This applied not only to fostering a good relationship between Hollywood and 
the federal government, but to interests as diverse as radio broadcasters, lawyers, oil 
companies, newspapers, even “circus people” – most any constituency capable of 
organizing sufficient pressure to generate “bad publicity” or a call for further regulation of 
the movies.46  
Most studios submitted to such “voluntary censorship,” wanting approval to avoid 
controversy erupting after a film was in release. Columbia’s Irving Briskin demonstrated 
such concern to be on the right side of the Bureau of Prisons when approaching the PCA 
about a story entitled Escape from Alcatraz in 1939. The basic premise involved two 
government operatives being planted in Alcatraz as prisoners, to gain the confidence of an 
inmate who knows where a major crime ring has hidden its ill-gotten gains. The film would 
feature an “attempted break for freedom,” but Briskin assured the PCA he would “show this 
attempt to be completely broken up and mastered by the Alcatraz authorities.”47 Evidently 
“very anxious” about the agreement, Briskin earnestly promised to “do only the right thing” 
and show Alcatraz “as an institution respected by the world as well as its own inmates.” He 
even suggested the Bureau should send a representative to work alongside the filmmakers, 
offering to “cooperate in every way.” 48  Unfortunately for Briskin, the “planting” of 
operatives in prisons for the purpose of “securing evidence” was a practice that Bennett had 
determinedly stamped out as part of his reforms. When consulted, the Bureau “felt that this 
phase of the story treatment constituted such an important departure from present practice 
that the Department could not afford to extend cooperation.”49  
In the end, without the BOP’s involvement, Briskin and Columbia simply preserved 
their story by setting it in a state prison rather than a federal one, and renaming the movie 
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Behind Prison Gates (1939). This might make Briskin’s promises to “cooperate in every way” 
seem disingenuous, but the ‘gentleman’s agreement’ was worded so as to apply only to 
federal prisons and “all stories dealing with Alcatraz” in particular.50 In his official position, 
Bennett had no authority to comment on the prison systems in individual states, and he 
observed this distinction quite carefully. PCA files show that he did not interfere in the 
cinematic representations of state prisons such Inside the Walls of Folsom Prison (Warner 
Bros., 1950) or fictional penitentiaries like the Westgate prison of Brute Force (Universal, 
1947). Bennett was certainly troubled by the magnified effect that movies had played in the 
public’s image of life behind bars ever since MGM’s pre-Code The Big House (1930), yet 
within his governance of the BoP the key thing was to ensure that Alcatraz itself was kept 
“out of the limelight.”51 This was not simply because of the sensationalism press that the 
Rock attracted. Even as Briskin pledged not “to show Alcatraz in anything but the finest 
light,” any “showing” of Alcatraz was a problem for Bennett.52   As the Justice Department 
had explained to Hays, while the island prison was “an essential part” of the system, 
“nevertheless it contains only about 300 prisoners out of the nearly 16,500 in Federal penal 
institutions.” In their analysis, the infamy of Alcatraz distracted the American public from 
understanding what the BOP was trying to achieve, and any film that focused on it would 
“give a false impression of our whole penal program.”53 As Bennett later wrote in his 
autobiography, “always when I went to Alcatraz… it seemed to me that this was the place 
where the legend of the big house in the annals of crime would live the longest and die the 
hardest.”54 Simply by affording it the stature inherent in a Hollywood movie, any film about 
Alcatraz would inflate that legend. Ensuring that filmmakers shifted their focus to other 
prisons was therefore enough to satisfy Bennett’s objections. 
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The other main factor in Bennett’s opposition to films about Alcatraz was concern 
that they perpetuated a “Gangster Hall of Fame.” The Department of Justice argued that 
any film which “played up the inmates” was “definitely not in the public interest”; and on 
that point, the PCA firmly agreed.55 Although John Dillinger, the FBI’s ‘public enemy number 
one’, had been killed rather than imprisoned, plans to make a film about him in 1934 had 
embroiled the industry in a storm of controversy and prompted the MPPDA to prohibit 
pictures which “glorified gangsters” as “detrimental to the public interest.”56 This rule was 
tentatively relaxed at the end of World War II, but was reinstated quickly, after an 
exploitative biopic of Dillinger (King Bros., 1945) and the morbid interest of filmmakers into 
the death of Al Capone in 1947 led to renewed denunciations of the film industry. The 
Code’s “special regulations on crime” were consequently amended, stating that “no picture 
shall be approved dealing with the life of a notorious criminal of current or recent times.” 
Although taken from “the standpoint of industry good and welfare,” these embargoes 
worked to the BOP’s advantage.57  
In fact, Bennett’s position was more nuanced than that of the Department of Justice 
as whole, arguing less for the “public interest”, and more for the interests of prisoners 
themselves. If popular culture continued to “build up” an exaggerated picture of Alcatraz, 
then in the public’s mind, any prisoner who was committed to the institution would 
“automatically” be seen as belonging to the “Gangster Hall of Fame” associated with the 
Rock.58 The reputation of Alcatraz would hang over prisoners, harming their prospects of 
being able to return to “useful positions in the community” upon release.59 Bennett argued 
repeatedly that “the community itself” had to “recognize its obligations in the rehabilitative 
process”; and he saw that popular culture worked against this, leading “too many people 
[to] believe that anyone and everyone who goes to prison is a fearsome creature.”60 As a 
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result, rather than support community rehabilitation, “they demand harsh measures and 
shun and discriminate against everyone who has a prison record.”61 As Bennett saw it, 
Hollywood risked “undermin[ing] the very values we must preserve in the American people 
if the men in our charge are to be given a fair opportunity.”62  
While believing that his argument applied to cultural representations of all prisons 
and prisoners, Bennett could only directly express his concerns to the PCA when filmmakers 
seemed set on “glamorizing” criminals who had been in federal custody. In 1953, he leaned 
on Breen to oppose Ida Lupino’s The Hitch-Hiker (The Filmmakers Inc., 1953), a tense film-
noir inspired by the mass killer William E. Cook who three years earlier had kidnapped 
motorists and murdered six victims, including an entire family. Cook had been sentenced to 
three hundred years in Alcatraz and Bennett therefore resisted, “in accordance with our 
usual policies,” Lupino’s efforts to get Cook’s “signature to a release” for the film rights to 
his “sadistic career.” 63  He contacted Breen, however, when Lupino’s representatives 
circumvented his authority, obtaining Cook’s consent when he was handed over to 
Californian authorities to stand a separate trial in El Centro. Breen accordingly warned 
Lupino’s company “to forget” the idea, invoking the regulations about “dealing with the life 
of a notorious criminal” to insist that Cook’s story would be “impossible” to film.64 Lupino’s 
strategy when faced with such obstruction though was as straightforward as Irving Briskin’s 
had been: simply “fictionalizing” the representation of Cook by changing his name to 
Emmett Myers (even while preserving the real and strikingly characteristic detail that Cook 
could only close one eye). When advised of Lupino’s change, Bennett conceded that he 
could have “no legal basis for objecting” to the production of a screenplay that actually 
made “no reference to William Edward Cook.”65 
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Production Code files on movies that were put into production have been catalogued 
by the Margaret Herrick Library for many years now; however, files on unmade projects 
demonstrate that Bennett had also agitated against a biopic of Cecil L. Wright, the so-called 
“Brain of Alcatraz,” when independent producer Sam Baerwitz acquired the rights to 
Wright’s story in 1948. Like Stroud, Wright had been incarcerated in both Leavenworth and 
Alcatraz, and whereas Stroud used his time to master avian pathology, Wright spent 
eighteen years studying the law and issuing successive writs of habeas corpus. In 1948, his 
thirteenth petition was finally successful in demonstrating that his original trial had been 
flawed, and won him his freedom. Newspapers subsequently serialized Wright’s account as 
a major miscarriage of justice.66 However, when Baerwitz submitted a script based on that 
version of events to the PCA, Breen invoked the “gentleman’s agreement” with the Bureau, 
noting that it is “mandatory upon us to make certain” that the federal prisons and their 
personnel “are properly presented.”67 Bennett’s off-the-record response to Breen was to 
dismiss it as a “blood and thunder” portrayal of Wright’s “objectionable life,” aimed to 
“attract those who get sadistic delight out of this sort of thing.”68 Officially, the Bureau 
raised substantial objections, claiming that “if screened and released, [it] will be nothing 
more than a hoax upon the American motion picture public.”69  When Baerwitz, in 
consultation with Wright and his attorney, took “very violent exception” to that assertion, 
Bennett sent one of his assistant directors, Myrl Alexander, to set the producer “right” on a 
few facts.70  
In his serialization, Wright insisted that he had been framed in 1930 for a post-office 
robbery, when he had actually been 200 miles from the scene of the crime, “under the care 
of a doctor for an infected hand.”71 Bennett countered that the published story ignored the 
fact that the infection was the result of Wright having been “injured by a bullet”; and that 
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he had been arrested in possession of a gun “stolen from a National Guard Armory.”72 The 
Bureau objected too to Wright’s portrayal of himself as someone who had been “railroaded 
into jail” and then spent most of his life fighting to “prove his innocence.”73 As Alexander 
stressed, Wright’s innocence had not been established by his release; indeed, he had 
pleaded guilty to crimes (including automobile theft) for which he served sentences in 
Illinois state prisons, and his law suits had won his freedom “on a technicality” rather than 
proof of innocence.74 
To enhance his image as ‘The Brain of Alcatraz’, Wright had also exaggerated his 
ingenuity, claiming that he had surreptitiously fashioned candles from paraffin wax used in 
the prison laundry, so as to be able to “study law for hours” in his cell after lights out.75 
Alexander dismissed this romanticization, noting “many prisoners” read at night “by light 
which drifts in... from exterior lighting.” He likewise debunked Wright’s claim that other 
inmates “lined up” outside his cell to receive his legal advice.76 Like Stroud, Wright had also 
claimed that his “outwitting” of the prison authorities had led to reprisals, and that he found 
himself “ticketed to Alcatraz... not as an incorrigible or as a desperado, but as a man... who 
sought justice for himself and for other men.”77 The Bureau’s version, however, was very 
different, stating that Wright had been one of the “unprincipled agitators” in a work strike in 
Leavenworth in July of 1941, at a time “when the [prison] factory was working at full 
schedule on defense orders,” and “for that reason alone, he was transferred to Alcatraz.”78  
The PCA was kept abreast of this correspondence by Bennett, so that Breen was 
aware of the BOP’s objections. Baerwitz was far from persuaded by these efforts to discredit 
Wright; yet for as long as the Bureau maintained that the screenplay was a “gross 
misrepresentation of the facts” to which “the true story of Cecil Wright... fundamentally 
bears little relationship,” he would struggle to persuade the PCA that the institutions of the 
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federal government were being “represented fairly.”79 Baerwitz made one further appeal to 
Breen in August of 1951, but a memorandum in the PCA file on this unproduced movie 
simply notes, “there is nothing further for us to do.”80  
Of course, one might argue that the Bureau’s suppression of ‘The Cecil Wright Story’ 
was a conspiracy to cover-up a gross miscarriage of justice, just as Stroud’s supporters were 
later to claim was the case in Bennett’s opposition to Birdman of Alcatraz. Certainly the 
image of the “American judicial and prison system” was of concern to Bennett, arguing to 
Breen that the proposed Wright movie would “constitute a grave disservice to the cause of 
public respect for the processes of law, our courts and our penal institutions.”81 Yet while 
there is no way of verifying the Bureau’s motives for sure, the Cecil Wright case – along with 
criticism of The Hitch-hiker and consistent efforts to block films about Alcatraz from 1938 
onwards – serves to demonstrate that Bennett was at least not singling Stroud out when 
obstructing Birdman, and that his opposition was more policy than “personal vendetta.”82 In 
fact, at one point Bennett was opposing the Stroud and Wright stories at exactly the same 
time.  
In 1948, the year of Wright’s release and some years before the interest of the film 
industry was piqued by the publication of Gaddis’s book, Hollywood agent Richard Polimer 
had contacted Robert Stroud’s brother, Marcus, to begin “talking about a possible movie.” 
As a “bird enthusiast [who] found his rare birds dying of a contagious disease,” Polimer had 
made use of Stroud’s Digest and his fascination with the author had stemmed from there. 
Bennett learned of this when Stroud wrote to his sister, boasting of a film deal that would 
“run into real money.”83 When a contract was entered into in early 1950, Polimer received a 
call from Bennett, inviting him to Washington and making him privy to the Bureau’s files on 
Stroud. According to Babyak, the hours spent “delving into reports from wardens and prison 
19 
 
officers” convinced Polimer that “he had been given a false picture by Marcus,” and that he 
no longer wanted to make a film about a “vicious murderer.”84 In this instance, Bennett had 
not needed to involve the PCA; Polimer’s idea for a movie about Stroud had not even got to 
the scripting stage before the Bureau pre-empted it. Changing circumstances and attitudes, 
however, were soon to conspire against Bennett’s abilities to constrain filmmakers. 
 
Caging the Birdman 
The publication of Gaddis’s Birdman of Alcatraz in 1955 changed things substantially, 
creating a situation that Bennett struggled to contain.  There are cursory comments about 
this in Phyllis Gaddis’s afterword to later reprints of her father’s work and in Gary Fishgall’s 
biography of Burt Lancaster, summarizing that although unsuccessful in his efforts to 
dissuade Random House from publishing the book, Bennett did convince the editors of 
Readers’ Digest not to reprint articles based on Gaddis’s work, and discouraged producers 
Joshua Logan and Jack Cummings from adapting the book to screen.  The Production Code 
Administration files reveal much more about this however, demonstrating that as soon as 
20th Century-Fox acquired the rights to Birdman in early 1956, Bennett contacted the PCA to 
object “very strenuously” to it as “an unwarranted and untruthful portrayal of the Federal 
Prison system” – even while admitting that he had “not seen the script for this picture and 
do not know exactly how it is to be handled.” Basing his objections to the proposed film on 
the book from which it was to be derived, he sought to discredit it as “completely fictional” 
– arguing with some justification that, although “made to appear as though it is authentic 
and biographical,” Gaddis’s account was “based entirely upon one-sided data secured by the 
author from letters and material of ‘Birdman’ Stroud to his brothers and others,” written 
without access to “the official records of this Department.”85  
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It was a similar line to the one that had convinced Breen to reject the ‘Cecil Wright 
Story’. However, there had been a change at the PCA itself in the intervening years, with 
Breen having retired in October 1954. His replacement, Geoffrey Shurlock, had served as 
Breen’s deputy for twenty years, but was considered “less dogmatic and less 
confrontational” than his former boss.86 Bennett seemed unsure of where he now stood. He 
reminded Shurlock of the “arrangement we had with Mr Breen and possibly yourself 
whereby we were given an opportunity to comment on any script dealing with our system 
before your approval was granted”; but as if uncertain of the current status of that 
agreement, Bennett added two other lines of attack. One was a combination of emotional 
pressure and legal threat: informing Shurlock that the “wife and children” of the murdered 
officer Andrew Turner were “still alive”; while also noting that 20th Century-Fox ought to be 
“extremely cautious about the repercussions that might follow an invasion of the Turner 
family’s rights of privacy.” The other approach was to suggest that Bennett had the power 
to stir up bigger trouble for the film industry.  
“You may recall,” he reminded Shurlock, “that while I was secretary of the Section of 
Criminal Law of the American Bar Association we had some conferences concerning 
problems relating to the effect of excessive brutality in motion pictures upon law 
enforcement and the well-being of our young people.” This comment bore little relation to 
Birdman specifically, for there was no “excessive brutality” in Gaddis’s narrative; but the 
“the well-being of our children” was a sensitive subject in the mid-1950s. With hysteria 
about juvenile delinquency dominating political discourse, the finger was being pointed at 
the nefarious influence of popular culture, including films, on rising youth crime rates.87 
Rebel Without a Cause (Warner Bros. 1955) was accused of inspiring for various ‘copy cat 
crimes’, while Blackboard Jungle (MGM, 1955) was criticised by a Senate committee for its 
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depiction of vicious, alienated youth and withdrawn from the Venice Film Festival after 
pressure from the State Department. Bennett’s statement to Shurlock, that “our committee 
is continuing to maintain its interest,” carried the veiled threat that should cooperation on 
Birdman not be forthcoming, the Bureau might add its voice to those charging Hollywood 
with fomenting delinquent behaviour.88 It was an illustration of why Breen had considered 
“industry policy” a vital component of the PCA’s remit to protect the studios. 
Facing such pressures, including Turner’s widow writing to plead with him personally 
not to “glorify the depraved murderer,” Joshua Logan passed on Birdman.89 But 20th 
Century-Fox still possessed the rights, and in the spring of 1958, they attracted the attention 
of Jack Cummings. Famous as a producer of musicals, from Born to Dance in 1936 through 
to Seven Brides for Seven Brothers in 1954, Cummings had only recently left MGM, and 
evidently saw in Birdman the opportunity to make his mark as a ‘serious’ producer at Fox. 
Executives at the studio, however, were so accustomed to the Production Code’s 
requirements as to have become part of the enforcement apparatus itself. Thus Frank 
McCarthy, Fox’s director of public relations and liaison with the PCA, immediately warned 
Cummings that his production entailed an “important public relations consideration,” and 
that the studio “would not wish to have the story come off as a blanket condemnation of 
prison authorities in general or even of the Alcatraz authorities as a group.”90 
McCarthy seemed “confident” that Cummings was not intending to “preach a 
sermon against the national penal system.”91 Yet within two weeks of this correspondence, 
both he and the producer were called to an extraordinary meeting with Bennett’s boss, 
Attorney General William P. Rogers, who told them bluntly that “Mr Stroud is insane and 
has been for some time.”92 Earlier that year, Bennett had visited Stroud in the company of 
eminent psychiatrist Karl Menninger, author of The Human Mind. Although Menninger 
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“later wrote that he only spent a “few minutes” with Stroud,” the visit in itself was enough 
to ferment innuendo about the prisoner’s mental state, which Gaddis claimed was part of 
the Bureau’s effort to discredit his book.93 Certainly Rogers raised it to dissuade the 
filmmakers, claiming that Stroud could not “be even considered for parole because of his 
mental condition.”94 Although Cummings expressed his doubts and wanted to discuss it with 
Menninger directly, McCarthy felt compelled to tell the studio heads that even if the 
psychiatrist contradicted Rogers, “the assertion of insanity by the Attorney General 
personally would kill the possibility of our getting a satisfactory story out of this material.”95 
Within days, McCarthy had written to the PCA, confirming that “20th Century-Fox has 
dropped the project.”96  
Cummings, however, was far from happy with that outcome. His papers relating to 
the Birdman project reveal that he had already been in contact with the Committee for the 
Release of Robert Stroud. Two months before the summons to meet the Attorney General, 
Stroud’s lawyer, Stanley Furman, had copied to Cummings a number of proforma letters 
that Bennett and the Bureau of Prisons had customarily dispatched to Congressmen and 
bird clubs whenever they wrote to question Stroud’s incarceration. While acknowledging 
that “the story of a man like Stroud being interested in birds is an appealing one,” the BOP 
letters repeatedly reminded the correspondents of the “extremely serious criminal record” 
of Stroud, who had been a “constant source of trouble and agitation.”97 Furman also 
enclosed a letter from the editor of Scientific American concerning an article which Gaddis 
had written for the magazine in 1957, celebrating Stroud’s avarian insights. The letter stated 
that Bennett had dissuaded the editors of Reader’s Digest from reprinting the article when 
they had contacted the BOP to check its veracity. Claiming the BOP had “killed” the reprint, 
Furman sent it to Cummings with the note: “This will give you some background on what to 
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expect from Mr Bennett.”98 In this context, the heavy-handed tactics of the Attorney 
General could only have affirmed for him the Committee’s assertion that the government 
were conspiring to silence and censor Stroud’s story.  
Cummings therefore sought to persuade Spyros Skouras, the company’s president, 
to allow him to proceed, promising he would present the Bureau of Prisons not only as 
“blameless” but as “probably the most enlightened, humane and progressive of any penal 
system in the world today.” As he argued it, it was a testament to the “humanity” of the 
American prison system that Stroud had received such “extraordinary privileges” in being 
permitted to breed and raise his birds: “In what other country would a man convicted or 
two murders, a troublesome convict, be given such humane and thoughtful treatment?” He 
promised, perhaps somewhat disingenuously given his correspondence with Gaddis and 
Furman, that “if there has been an injustice done, I have no desire to proclaim it” and that 
he only wanted to emphasise the story of “an American of indomitable spirit – a man who 
proves that independence and will and courage, the qualities that made this nation great, 
still exist – even behind prison walls.” 99 Yet his appeal was of little avail. In late September, 
Rogers cut Cummings out of the loop to meet with Skouras personally, and brought Bennett 
with him. His stance fully endorsed by Rogers, Bennett reiterated all of the objections he 
had raised before, remaining “dead set against treating Birdman of Alcatraz in any form.”100 
Skouras capitulated and in May 1959 the studio’s option on Gaddis’s book was allowed to 
expire, even as Cummings still pleaded to know “why must we be pushed around by the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons?”101 
Having dissuaded Polimer and Logan and effectively stymied Cummings in the 
attempts to film Stroud’s story, Bennett appeared to be in control. But faultlines had 
become apparent in the process. Cummings’ papers also show that during discussions at 
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Fox, the matter of the “gentleman’s agreement” with the Bureau had been raised by the 
head of the studio’s story department, David Brown, questioning whether the studio 
needed to submit the script to the Department of Justice. McCarthy had replied that he did 
not consider it necessary unless they were seeking cooperation “to shoot on the Alcatraz 
reservation itself”; and he knew such an outcome was unlikely, since the BOP had 
consistently refused to permit the taking of pictures on the island since 1938.102  Yet 
McCarthy had only taken up his job at Fox in 1951, and his response to Brown implies that 
he believed the “gentleman’s agreement” with the BOP operated on the same basis as the 
“cooperation agreement” with the Department of Defense, which only required the 
approval of scripts as and when practical assistance was being sought. The preemptive 
intervention of Rogers and Bennett rendered further discussion of the nature of the 
agreement a moot point, yet the memos between Brown and McCarthy suggest that its 
original terms had been forgotten by at least some senior figures in Hollywood in the 
Fifties.103  
In a related factor, the Production Code itself had been amended in December 1956, 
with the clause “designed precisely to prevent the making of stories which might add to the 
heroic stature of criminals of notoriety” having been removed.104 Shurlock retained the 
authority to reject films dealing with notorious criminals if they contained “excessive 
brutality”; but once United Artists released Baby Face Nelson in 1957, it was followed in 
quick succession by Machine Gun Kelly (American-International, 1958), The Bonnie Parker 
Story (American-International, 1958), Al Capone (Allied Artists, 1959), and The Rise and Fall 
of Legs Diamond (Warner Bros., 1960), all testing the limits of the Code in pursuit of the 
profits to be made from reviving the gangster cycle. Thus the PCA’s ability to stop a film like 
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Birdman of Alcatraz had been eroded considerably, perhaps explaining why the BOP had 
pressured 20th Century-Fox directly rather than rely on Shurlock.  
Within two years, however, Bennett probably wished he had taken Cummings up on 
his offer to make a version of Birdman in which the Bureau would be presented as 
“enlightened, humane, progressive” and “blameless.”105 
 
The Birdman Pecks Back 
When Norma Productions submitted Guy Trosper’s screenplay in July 1960, Shurlock 
forwarded copies of the earlier correspondence between the PCA, Bennett and Frank 
McCarthy, drawing attention to the Bureau’s objections to Birdman’s production as “an 
unwarranted and untruthful portrayal.”106 But while the PCA certainly considered Birdman 
to be a “serious problem of policy” for “present[ing] the federal penal system in an 
extremely unfavourable light,” it now drew a distinction between “industry policy” and the 
specific remit of the Code. Without the regulation on “notorious criminals”, the only point 
on which Trosper’s script “might be said to be in technical violation of the Code” was the 
article which insisted: “The history, institutions, prominent people and citizenry of all 
nations shall be represented fairly.”107 While in the cases of Briskin’s and Baerwitz’s 
proposed Alcatraz productions, Breen had broadly accepted Bennett’s word that their 
representation of federal prisons as institutions was unfair, Shurlock was now less prepared 
to do so. He had taken charge of the PCA at a point when independent filmmakers were 
challenging the Code repeatedly.  
United Artist’s announcement in 1956 that they would release Otto Preminger’s 
Man With a Golden Arm without PCA approval if necessary (dismissing objections to the 
film’s portrayal of drug addiction as evidence that the Code was “antiquated”) had resulted 
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in rapid amendments to the Code to defuse the stand-off. Keen to avoid further 
confrontations unless the grounds for impeding a production on the basis of the Code were 
rock solid, Shurlock knew that any assertion of “industry policy” was certain to be 
challenged. Thus when presented with the script of Birdman the PCA this time asserted that 
it did not “feel qualified” to say whether the Bureau and its Chief were being presented 
“fairly” – and that “authority... to proceed further in evaluating this story” would therefore 
have to come directly “from the Board of Directors” of the Motion Picture Producer’s 
Association if it wanted to consider the consequences of crossing the Bureau of Prisons.108 
Shurlock effectively sidestepped the issue and chose to define his position in the narrowest 
terms, reporting on July 19, 1960, that “the basic story seems to meet the provisions of the 
Code.”109  
Without the PCA running interference, Bennett’s position was suddenly vulnerable. 
From their contact with Cummings, Tom Gaddis and Stanley Furman were aware of how the 
Bureau had undermined previous efforts to make Birdman - and as Lancaster’s company 
began production, Stroud’s supporters struck back, now exposing Bennett’s actions to the 
American public. Paul O’Neil’s article in Life magazine in April 1960 was a major blow, 
detailing “Bennett’s most recent suppression of the Stroud story.” Specifically it revealed 
how Meninger’s visit to Alcatraz had been used to raise doubts about Stroud’s sanity in an 
effort to discredit him, and how Bennett had “warned the Fox people “for their own good” 
that they should not risk the movie.” 110  
Lancaster invited Gaddis and Furman to join him at press conferences promoting the 
film in 1961 and 1962, to further denounce the “extraordinary efforts” of the Bureau to 
“prevent the story of Robert Stroud from reaching the public.” 111  Director John 
Frankenheimer claimed too that he had been blocked by the Bureau when he had earlier 
27 
 
tried to “tell Stroud’s story as a live television drama for CBS.”112 Bennett the ‘reformer’ and 
champion of “New Penology” was now being recast in the American media as a bullying, 
self-appointed censor. Unwittingly, he made this perception all the more credible early in 
1961 when he tried to quash an episode of the television series, The Untouchables (ABC, 
1959-63). Objecting to the depiction of a “venal” federal prison guard accepting a bribe as 
part of Al Capone’s escape attempt from a prison train, Bennett fired off “telegrams to 10 
ABC-affiliated tv stations,” threatening that the “Bureau of Prisons would oppose their 
license renewals” if they broadcast the episode.113 This heavy-handed move backfired badly. 
Even those critics who disliked The Untouchables for its “excessive violence,” decried 
Bennett’s “attempted censorship” as the greater “social evil.”114 Coinciding with the pre-
release of Birdman of Alcatraz, it simply gave the filmmakers further ammunition. As 
Lancaster put it bluntly in one press conference: “Mr Bennett is not the censor of what the 
American people shall see, nor is he paid for this purpose.”115  
As the release of the movie prompted thousands to write in protest to the Bureau 
about Stroud’s prolonged incarceration, Bennett had to repeatedly dispute the “foolish” 
idea that he was motivated by a “personal feud,” reminding critics that “Stroud’s case was 
repeatedly reviewed by attorneys general and parole boards, by members of the judiciary, 
and by our classification committees, but none of us believed he was anything but a 
psychopathic killer.”116 Bennett even opened the Bureau’s files to Washington Post reporter 
Eve Edstrom, whose ensuing articles sought to prove that “the Birdman’s failure to win his 
freedom” was not the result of “a personal vendetta.”117 The prison reports Edstrom cited 
made it clear Stroud “would accept none of the usual conditions of parole. He wanted 
unlimited travelling privileges, wanted to decide where he would live, who would be 
responsible for him, and what requirements would govern his activities.” 118 
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Damningly for his parole prospects, Stroud had also never “expressed any remorse” 
for his murders, quoted by Edstrom as saying that he still “believed the taking of life was 
necessary.” The articles further supported Bennett’s narrative in showing how the Bureau 
had gone to “extraordinary” lengths to accommodate Stroud’s bird research, only for him to 
“flagrantly violate their trust.” Not only was “a letter smuggling operation conducted” 
through shipments of birdcages, but Stroud’s cell had been “the center of moonshining 
activities,” fermenting bird feed into alcohol. When transported to Alcatraz, Stroud 
“boasted about how he had been ‘cooking’ 188 proof grain alcohol for 13 years without the 
‘dumb bunch’ at Leavenworth knowing it.”119 With the support of Senator Edward Long, 
chair of the Senate subcommittee concerned with federal penitentiaries, Bennett had 
Edstrom’s articles entered into the Congressional Record as an official corrective to the film, 
“in order for the entire nation to know of heretofore unpublished facts.”120 
In the final analysis though, as Bennett feared, it was the film, not the Congressional 
Record, that would leave the most indelible impression on the public mind. Trosper’s 
screenplay did acknowledge the murders for which Stroud was imprisoned, and gave credit 
to the Bureau’s position that he had “taken the lives of two human beings and... hadn’t even 
felt a twinge of conscience.” It even included a scene of Stroud getting drunk in his cell on 
180 proof alcohol. But Burt Lancaster’s Oscar-nominated performance as Stroud brought 
great dignity to the convict, who (in the actor’s own assessment) “took a miserable, 
unnatural existence and yet made it a meaningful thing.”121 In the film, Stroud’s early 
belligerence and impulsiveness mellows into quiet, stoic decency as, through raising and 
caring for his birds, he comes to respect life and treasure freedom. It was a depiction far 
removed from Bennett’s view of Stroud as an unrepentant psychopath. As one former 
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Alcatraz officer put it, those who wrote in their thousands asking for the release of the 
Birdman “didn’t want Robert Stroud pardoned. They wanted Burt Lancaster pardoned.”122  
From the outset, as is typical of prison films, the central conflict is established as 
Stroud’s defiant efforts to sustain his “rights” and his individuality against the oppressive 
inhumanity of the prison system. And when embodying this antagonism in the single 
character of warden Harvey Shoemaker (played by Karl Malden), Trosper deliberately 
imbued him with close parallels, in role, position and philosophy, to Bennett himself.  
At a key point in the film, just before Stroud begins raising birds, Shoemaker steps 
down from his role as Stroud’s warden to head to Washington D.C. and “plan” the “new 
Federal Bureau of Prisons” that Bennett had planned in 1930. He subsequently returns to 
Leavenworth, dispatched as a “delegate of the Bureau” to negotiate with Stroud over his 
bird business, again fulfilling Bennett’s role. Shoemaker regards himself as a progressive 
reformer, looking back on his career with pride in the “advances I helped to inaugurate,” 
telling Stroud to “think back to the old times: leg irons, carrying the iron ball, stripes, 
corporal punishment... I have been instrumental in abolishing that kind of treatment.” 
Bennett had indeed “struck first and hardest” against prison brutality and withstood 
considerable opposition from wardens and guards in stamping out even “secretly practiced” 
corporal punishment.123  He had consistently fought, too, for the “constructive work 
programme” which his cinematic counterpart claims as his own centrepiece of prison 
reform. However, in aligning the fictional Shoemaker with Bennett, the film also makes him 
the agent of official retribution. 
When Stroud’s death sentence for the fatal stabbing of the prison guard is 
commuted to life, Shoemaker warns him angrily that he will have vengeance: “No matter 
what happens to me, no matter where I am, if I ever get a chance to punish you further, I’ll 
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do it.” Everything which then befalls Stroud becomes tainted by the notion that it 
constitutes Shoemaker’s vindictiveness. The “directives from Washington” which give 
Stroud only sixty days to “get rid” of his aviary, come at a point when Shoemaker is the only 
person in Washington of whom the audience knows. When frustrated and defeated by 
Stroud’s campaign “to tell the public how they are going to take his birds away from him,” 
and by the prisoner’s calm mastery of regulations that Shoemaker himself had written 
(quoting “Rule 60 of the Federal Bureau of Prisons manual”), he leaves with another parting 
shot: “Keep one thing in mind, Bob. The public has a short memory.” 
The sense that the Bureau is just biding its time thus presses in on scenes concerning 
Stroud’s hopes for parole. The film’s substitute for Della Jones expresses “faith” that the 
parole board will “see how good you are” and recognize the “great things” Stroud has 
accomplished in avian research as evidence of rehabilitation. Such faith is heartlessly 
crushed, however, by Stroud’s overnight transfer to Alcatraz – presented as an underhand 
move by the Bureau to circumvent the parole board and keep him in captivity. By such 
means, Trosper and Frankenheimer gave cinematic substance to Robert Stroud’s paranoid 
belief that his “illegal confinement” was motivated by “personal animosity.”124 
In the film, Stroud’s main defender in Leavenworth, a prison doctor, comes to 
wonder “if the Bureau isn’t afraid of Stroud. Afraid to let the public know what kind of a 
brain they’re keeping locked up here.” He becomes a voice celebrating Stroud’s “genius”, 
even suggesting that if released, Stroud could turn his “staggering” mind to curing human 
diseases. The petty-minded vindictiveness of the Bureau is thus presented as exacting a cost 
not only on Stroud as an individual, but on the collective progress of mankind.  
Stroud’s confrontation with Shoemaker culminates in an attack on the prison system 
itself as damaging to humanity, criticising the BOP’s failure to rehabilitate its charges and 
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recognize their potential “worth” to society as individuals. When Shoemaker discovers 
Stroud is writing a stinging critique of U.S. prisons and defends his own record of reform, 
Stroud explodes with a righteous diatribe, accusing the Bureau of wanting to crush 
individuality. “You want your prisoners to dance out the gates like puppets on a string,” 
claims Stroud. “With rubber stamp values impressed by you, your sense of conformity, your 
sense of behaviour, even your sense of morality.” 
In their first encounter, Shoemaker had told Stroud, “you’ll conform to our ideas of 
how you should behave.” Thirty five years later, Stroud asserts that the warden hasn’t 
“retreated from that stance one inch.” In truth, the accusation was unfair to Bennett, who 
had long been a key advocate for the “individualized treatment” of prisoners.125 Birdman, 
however, is fundamentally about its protagonist’s defiant struggle to maintain his 
individuality, and so Shoemaker’s philosophy had to be presented as antagonistic to that. In 
the analysis Stroud presents in the film, the Bureau’s approach to rehabilitation through 
enforced “conformity” was doomed to failure, and he reproaches Shoemaker as if 
channelling the sentiments of all convicts: 
On the outside, they’re lost, automatons, just going through the motions of living. But 
underneath there’s a deep, deep hatred for what you did to them. First chance they 
get to attack society they take it. The result, more than half come back to prison. 
Bennett knew well that the recidivism rates of released convicts who “return to prison for a 
postgraduate course” presented a “dark statistical picture”; and that even by the 1960s, 
many American prisons lacked “the elements which can have a constructive influence on 
offenders.”126 In Bennett’s own view, he was the modernizer, constantly frustrated by 
legislators who “set back” progress by cutting funds for rehabilitation programmes and by a 
public that “demands more of the iron fist approach.”127 But the film holds Bennett’s 
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counterpart personally responsible. “That’s why you’re a failure, Harvey,” concludes 
Lancaster as Stroud. 
What must have made this scene especially galling for Bennett was that Lancaster’s 
dialogue was drawn from the real manuscript on prison history that Stroud had been writing 
in Alcatraz. The reference to recidivism threw Bennett’s own words back at him, for Stroud 
opened his book with one of the Director’s public speeches in which he openly stated that 
“more than half” of those “who left prison last year will be back within five years.” Stroud 
presented this as the “most startling admission of failure” - and was adamant that “the one 
man most responsible for that failure is none other than Mr James V. Bennett.”128 Given 
that the Bureau had resisted all of Stroud’s attempts to have his book printed, the 
incorporation of its opening pages into the central argument of a major motion picture was 
both a pointed subversion of the BOP’s authority (likely orchestrated by Furman), and a 
telling strike in Stroud’s self-conceived “contest of wills” with Bennett.129  
The resulting irony was that the impression of the penal system audiences took from 
Birdman of Alcatraz was actually in considerable accord with Bennett’s own analysis. For 
Lancaster, the objective of the movie was “to say that the initial concept of prisons – to send 
men away to be punished – is not only inhuman but outdated.”130 As a vocal critic of 
America’s continued use of “antiquated bastilles built when penal philosophy demanded 
only sufficient space for penitence,” Bennett could not have agreed more.131 He would also 
have concurred with Lancaster that “more essential [than] anything else [is] to return and 
stimulate the criminal to some kind of dignity.”132  
In the preceding decade, Bennett had led the creation of open prisons, specifically to 
forge “a climate conducive to the [prisoner’s] acceptance of responsibility” – conscious of 
the paradoxes of a system that “sought to teach men how to live socially responsible lives... 
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in a prison which shears them of all responsibility.”133 Rehabilitation was such a cornerstone 
of Bennett’s thinking that he had earlier attempted to deflect 20th Century-Fox from making 
Birdman by instead offering them access to Bureau files to develop a documentary-style film 
that might convince the public and their Congressmen to better support the BOP’s 
rehabilitation program.134 Ironically, with the release of Birdman the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons became instead the “whipping boy” for its “overall indictment... of the penal system 
as a profoundly damning instrument of society.”135 Because of his fervent opposition to the 
filming of Stroud’s story, it was Bennett’s “authoritarian” rather than reforming side that 
was displayed to the world. “The authoritarian Bureau head,” wrote Gaddis when 
promoting the film, “not only decides what is good for you. He personally intervenes to stop 
anything that he thinks is not good for you.”136 For Gaddis, this was a “Big Brotherishness” 
from an un-elected official, “which raises questions even more disturbing than the fate of 
Robert Stroud.” Lancaster likewise denounced Bennett’s interference as “a real threat to the 
right of the public to freedom of expression.”137  
Similar arguments had been used in condemnation of the Production Code, attacked 
by rebellious filmmakers like Howard Hughes on First Amendment grounds, for “withholding 
a large body of information, knowledge and understanding of controversial topics, against 
the wishes of individual producers... and to the detriment of the public.”138 Walter Wanger, 
producer and member of the Committee for the Release of Robert F. Stroud, had himself 
been a long-time critic of the Code, for making it “almost impossible to face and deal with 
the modern world.”139 Both guardians of the “public interest” forged in the 1930s, Bennett 
and the Production Code Administration alike had become part of the ‘old guard’ by the 
1960s and found themselves on the defensive. In the end, however, the weaknesses of 
neither the PCA nor the BOP were of much benefit to Stroud himself. Though Birdman of 
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Alcatraz prompted as many as one-hundred thousand moviegoers to petition President 
Kennedy to release the Birdman from prison, the federal government held its ground.140 
Robert F. Stroud remained in federal custody until his death on November 21, 1963. 
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